Again, due to the recent activities around the Pacific Northwest cases, recommendations are made on how Skimming attacks might be countered.
The basic list looks like this (I've commented on some standout points...):
Fraudsters are Savvy to Surveillance - The writer suggests the Fraudsters KNOW that live video is not being monitored. However, they do not address the use of RECORDED video. Also, this is not a serious issue as the Fraudsters might simply use a machine without Video Surveillance.
Incidents Occur Quickly - 2-3 hours to collect a bunch of Account Data. That's about what would be expected. And then I suppose they move onto another machine.
No Wireless Technology - This is interesting in that the writer does not mention the use of wireless video cameras, something more commonly seen in the past. But they refer to the actual skimming device transmitting data wirelessly. I think it would certainly add costs and risk for the criminal, but it seems the use of a camera is still fairly likely.
Branch ATMs Preferred - The writer points out very good reasons for the preference of Branch Bank ATMs over Retail or otherwise, off-site ATMs. Easy access and high traffic volume, most important.
Certain Makes Targeted - I would say the regular use of specific model(s) is more related to familiarity and costs. If the Fraudsters can simply build ONE facade and product it in quantity, tehy can more quickly get the thefts underway at more places quicker and for less costs.
Merchants Can Help Detect Fraud - I find this most troubling. FIRST, consider the issue that the Retail organization DOES NOT check IDs when a Debit charge is being conducted. But SECOND. indeed, why/how should they? The main point of using a debit card, specifically with a customer swiping access point, is so the employee never NEEDS to check the card and/ or ID. It would seem to me a little strange after I've swiped my card and entered my PIN that an employee would ask me for the card and my ID.
Here's the whole article...